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The Marketisation of Charities in England and Wales 
Abstract 
Much has been written about the reasons for and impact of marketisation on charities, their 
clients, and wider civil society. A central component of the marketisation thesis is that 
charities are substituting grants and donations with commercial revenue. However there is no 
consensus in the existing literature as to whether the two sources of revenue are substitutes or 
complementary. This paper shows that between 2003 and 2007 there was a significant 
increase in the proportion of overall revenue attracted from commercial sources by charities 
in England and Wales. Using our preferred Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation model we show that the annual persistence of commercial revenue over time was 
44%. In particular, a +10% change in grants and donations was associated with a -3.1% 
change in commercial revenue.  
Keywords Charities, crowding out, marketisation, models with Panel Data, nonprofit, 
revenue mix, substitution effect 
Introduction 
Charitable activity has traditionally caused much anguish for neoclassical economists as 
philanthropy, volunteering and co-operative behaviour fall outside of the scope of rational 
choice behaviour. Indeed, the very existence of charities poses fundamental questions to 
neoclassical economic theory (Halfpenny and Reid 2002) which sees the world as bound by 
market exchange, rational choice and self-interested utility maximisation (Adaman and 
Madra 2002). The economic explanation is to imply that charities exist because of imperfect 
or underdeveloped markets for public goods (Weisbrod 1975). However they are 
productively inefficient when compared to the private firm due to their ‘non-distribution 
constraint.’ Effectively managers of charities have no incentive to minimise costs (Hansmann 
1987), and so are ‘crowded-out’ in fields where markets are well developed, but are over-
represented in fields such as health and social services where many consumers are unable to 
pay a market rate for the goods they consume (Hansmann 1987). If conventional economic 
theory treats charities as an inefficient anomaly then the ‘solution’ is to propose that they 
behave as private firms in efficient markets. Achieving this ‘solution’ necessitates improving 
the operation of markets for public goods, and introducing market discipline to charities 
(Tsakalotos 2005).  
It would appear that this neo-classical ‘solution’ is occurring in some countries. Since 
the 1980s Governments of both major parties in the United Kingdom have attempted to create 
more efficient markets for public goods through opening up the market for delivery of public 
services to providers from private and third sectors on a ‘best value’ basis (Newman 2007). 
This process accelerated under the recent New Labour government as charities were given an 
enhanced role in economic policy (Haugh and Kitson 2007). Another increasingly important 
aspect to this marketisation of the nonprofit sector involves the direct sale of goods and 
services by charities to consumers (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004), and a more recent 
innovation, the creation of subsidiary social enterprises with the primary aim of providing 
employment to clients (Teasdale 2010). Business and management scholars have turned their 
attention to nonprofits en masse to help them adapt to their new commercial environment 
(Dey and Steyaert 2010). A range of ‘how to’ texts set out simple steps for nonprofits to 
follow in order to avoid dependence on grants and donations by increasing their share of 
commercial revenue, and to become more efficient through the imposition of market 
discipline (see for example Dees et al. 2001).  
A counter discourse warns of the dangers of this ‘economic fallacy’. In seeing things 
through a neoclassical lens that excludes the possibility of behaviour not bound by market 
exchange and rational choice (Adaman and Madra 2002) we risk creating a world which loses 
sight of those values such as reciprocity, philanthropy and democracy (Tsakalotos 2005). The 
study of nonprofits through this lens has valorised a particular income source – commercial 
revenue (Eikenberry, 2009), and a particular form – the social enterprise (Dey and Steyaert 
2010). As a consequence it is argued that nonprofits are behaving more like businesses in 
replacing traditional sources of revenue with commercial revenue because they are expected, 
or even compelled to do so, rather than any rational assessment of the financial and social 
implications (Dart 2004; Eikenberry and Kluver 2004).  
The purpose of this paper is not to further develop the literature explaining 
marketisation and its consequences. For while much has been written about the reasons for, 
and implications of, charities succumbing to market forces, rather less attention has been paid 
to developing the evidence base to support (or deny) the underlying assumptions upon which 
the marketisation thesis rests. In this paper we address this deficit by answering the critical 
question: are charities substituting commercial revenue for grants and donations, or are the 
two income sources in fact complementary? To do this we constructed a large panel data set 
derived from registered general charities’ annual returns to the Charity Commission for 
England and Wales for the period 2002-2008.
i
 These returns were each analysed to determine 
the proportion of revenue attracted through commercial sources (fees for goods and services; 
and surplus generated from subsidiary trading operations), and voluntary income (grant and 
private donations).
ii
 All charities were classified according to the International Classification 
of Nonprofit Organisations (ICNPO) system. Using our preferred Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation model we found that commercial revenue was an inelastic 
substitute for grants and donations. Hence we conclude that marketisation of charities in 
England and Wales is occurring to a limited extent. 
The Marketisation Thesis 
The term marketisation is used to refer to nonprofits becoming “more market driven, client 
driven, self-sufficient, commercial or business like” (Dart 2004, p. 414) that is, adopting the 
languages, practices and funding mechanisms of the private sector. It is possible to 
distinguish between two broad but overlapping aspects of marketisation. The first involves 
nonprofits seeking to mimic the organisational structures, practices and languages of the 
private sector. To some extent this trend also involves the re-labelling of charitable activity as 
social entrepreneurship, and there is a wide literature developing that follows this tradition, 
particularly in business and management schools (see Dees 2007). The second aspect of 
marketisation which particularly concerns us in this paper focuses more narrowly on the ways 
in which nonprofits are funded. That is a supposed transfer from grants and donations to 
commercial revenue.  
Commercial revenue is itself a broad category (See Table 1) which is generally used 
to include program service fees; the sale of products not directly associated with the 
charitable activity; contracts to deliver services on behalf of a third party; profits from for-
profit subsidiaries; and fees for endorsing products (Dart 2004; Eikenberry and Kluver 2004; 
Kerlin and Pollak 2011).  
Table 1 Here 
 
Aggregate trends in marketisation 
While charities attracting commercial revenue is not a new phenomenon (Teasdale2010), it is 
widely accepted that their reliance on commercial sources has increased significantly since 
the 1970s, and now makes up the largest source of revenue in both the US (Kerlin and Pollak 
2011) and England and Wales (NCVO 2010). This trend is widely attributed in the United 
States to a decline in government grants and private contributions in the 1970s and 1980s 
leading nonprofits to pursue new revenue sources (Dees 1998; Eikenberry and Kluver 2004; 
Froelich 1999; Salamon 1993, 1997). When counter posed with an aggregate increase in 
commercial revenue (Salamon 1997), an assumption is made that commercial revenue was 
(and more importantly, remained) a substitute for grants and donations for the sector as a 
whole (Eikenberry 2009). 
However, a systematic analysis of trends in nonprofit commercial activity in the US 
between 1982 and 2002 shows that while commercial revenue rose by 219% over the period, 
private donations and government grants also rose (by 197% and 169% respectively) (Kerlin 
and Pollak 2011). Other studies are inconclusive, and have drawn on small samples (LeRoux 
2005), focused on limited subfields within the sector (Guo 2006; Kingma 1995), or relied on 
changes between two time points rather than attempting to show trends (Foster and Bradach 
2005; Teasdale et al. 2013). Thus the only reliable evidence we have is that in the US there 
has been a gradual increase in the proportion of revenue attracted from commercial sources 
by nonprofits. This has been accompanied by a real increase in government grants and private 
giving to nonprofits over the same period (Kerlin and Pollak 2011). But the marketisation 
thesis implies more than a gradual trend for charities to increase the proportion of their 
income attracted from commercial revenue. The term marketisation is used explicitly to refer 
to the substitution of traditional sources of nonprofit funding, that is grants and donations, by 
commercial revenues (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004). 
In England and Wales the changing political and economic environment during the 
period of Labour government between 1997 and 2009 are likely to have impacted upon 
charities’ revenue streams. Nicholls (2010) shows that in the US foundations, such as the 
Ashoka and the Skoll Foundation, funded by the private sector, and promoting the market 
logics of that sector, are the dominant drivers of the commercialisation of nonprofits. He 
notes that a major difference in England and Wales is the enhanced role played by 
government in coercing charities to become more business-like. For example, major grant 
programmes designed to facilitate charities becoming more sustainable through attracting 
commercial revenues, and the government’s creation and funding of umbrella bodies to 
provide support to nonprofits attracting trading income (Carmel and Harlock 2008; Haugh 
and Kitson 2007).  
A second institutional driver is the changing way in which government funds 
nonprofits in England and Wales. Under the recent New Labour government there was a 
pervasive belief that charities and other third sector organisations were best placed to deliver 
public services due to their responsiveness to the consumer (Haugh and Kitson 2007). As the 
process of opening up public service delivery to a wider range of private and non-profit 
providers gathered pace in the new millennium, many charities saw increasing shares of their 
income derived through government contracts (Carmel and Horlock 2008). Together these 
institutional drivers would suggest that under New Labour, charities in England and Wales 
have been ‘encouraged’ to replace grants and donations with commercial income, whether 
through the delivery of government contracts or the private sale of goods and services. This 
policy trend has been continued, or even accelerated under a Conservative led coalition 
government. The Public Services (Social Value) Act was originally intended to enable 
charities and social enterprises to play an even greater role in the delivery of publicly funded 
services (Teasdale, Alcock and Smith 2012). Policy measures such as Big Society Capital 
aim to encourage social investment into charities and social enterprises enabling them to 
behave more like private firms and scale up in order to repay loan finance.  
However there are also opposing (or even complementary) trends which aim to 
encourage more traditional civil society logics such as self-help, community development, 
and philanthropy. At the level of the European Union a recent policy focus on social 
innovation sometimes goes beyond marketization to stress the role of citizen engagement 
(Davies and Simon 2013) and new approaches to increase charitable giving such as crowd 
funding (Caulier-Grice et al. 2013). Similarly one aspect of the Big Society emphasised in the 
Giving White Paper released by the Cabinet Office (2011) involves encouraging greater 
giving to charities. An implicit assumption of this dual approach to increasing funds available 
to non-profits through commercial revenue and philanthropy is that for individual charities, 
commercial revenue and private donations are complementary. 
In England and Wales the annual Almanacs produced by NCVO (see NCVO, 2010) 
do demonstrate a gradual increase in reliance on commercial sources of revenue by charities 
since 2001 (see Figure 1). As in the US this increase in commercial revenue has been 
accompanied by a slightly smaller real terms increase in government and private giving to 
nonprofits. It would appear then that for the aggregate population of charities, commercial 
revenue and grants and donations are complementary as both sources have risen in tandem.  
Figure 1 Here 
What is happening at the organisational level? 
However it is not clear how the different income sources interact at the level of the individual 
charity. This is in part because, as in the United States (Kerlin and Pollak 2011), the number 
of charities has also increased over the same time period. Thus demand for grants and 
donations (and indeed commercial revenue) may have risen faster than supply. Moreover, the 
period for which data is available has seen a dramatic increase in the aggregate funding 
available to charities, much of which came from statutory sources at a time when charities 
became a significant player in social and economic policy for the first time (Clifford et al. 
2010; Haugh and Kitson 2007).  
Nonetheless, it might be that diversification of revenue streams offers net benefits to 
charities. Froelich (1999) argues that commercial income shows only moderate revenue 
volatility (see also Carroll and Stater 2009), and is the most flexible and least restrictive 
source of income available to nonprofits. From this perspective, pursuing commercial 
revenue is a rational diversification to reduce resource dependence (Froelich 1999; Caroll and 
Stater 2009), as the two sources of income may be complementary (Yetman et al. 2009). This 
may be explained by reputational effects whereby individuals, private firms and governments 
prefer to buy services from organisations whose high levels of voluntary income indicates 
legitimacy. Thus as grants and donations increase so does commercial revenue.  
To the best of our knowledge there are no studies in England and Wales which draw 
upon large scale data sets to determine whether commercial income is a substitute or 
complementary to grants and donations at the level of the individual charity. In the United 
States where data is available to conduct this analysis, most studies have treated grants and 
donations as the dependent variable (see for example Okten and Weisbrod 2000; Yetman  and 
Yetman 2003). Even here the evidence is mixed. This is in part due to the methods employed, 
which are largely descriptive, or unable to incorporate a dynamic model which can control 
for time effects (Tinkelman and Neely 2011). Where studies have investigated the impact of a 
change in grants and donations upon commercial revenue the evidence is inconclusive. Segal 
and Wisbrod (1998) draw upon a relatively small sample of 2,679 nonprofits observed 
between 1985 and 1993 and showed that after controlling for field and time effects there was 
a substitution effect in some industries but a complementary effect in others. The overall 
effect (-0.02) on the log of program service revenues (approximating to commercial revenue) 
of a one percent change in donations for the whole sample was not statistically significant. 
Segal and Wesibrod used a fixed effects model, probably the most appropriate technique at 
the time. However we show in our methodology section that econometric advances since 
their study mean that statisticians would not choose the same model today.  Moreover 
technological advances in the processing power of computers now permit similar analyses to 
be carried out using larger samples, or even the full population of charities. Therefore it 
remains unclear in the United States, and to the best of our knowledge has never been shown 
in England and Wales, whether charities are succumbing to market forces. Confirming (or 
denying) the marketisation thesis thus requires revisiting the research question: Is commercial 
revenue a substitute for grants and donations among charities? 
 Data 
In order to determine whether commercial revenue is a substitute for grants and donations, in 
charities, we constructed a large panel data set using data collated by Guidestar UK from 
registered charities’ annual returns to the Charity Commission in England and Wales. This 
covered the period 2002-2007. We included only general charities in our analysis. Thus our 
findings exclude public schools, NHS administered charities, independent hospitals, 
churches, housing associations, and grant making trusts. Our initial panel consisted of 
277,537 observations for all 80,589 general charities providing accounts to the Charity 
Commission between 2002 and 2007 (i.e. each charity provided an average of 3.4 
observations).  
To enable analysis by field of activity we matched all charities on our panel to the 
International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations (ICNPO) system originally developed 
by Salamon and Anheier (1998) to enable cross-national comparison between nonprofits 
operating in similar fields, using the ICNPO classification variable derived by NCVO
iii
 for all 
general charities in England and Wales. 
Our main variables of interest are organisational size (size) (using overall income as 
an indicator); field of activity (ICNPO); overall income (i); voluntary income (iv); and 
commercial revenue (is). Commercial revenue provides our main dependent variable. 
Voluntary income (iv) was derived from the sub-categories of legacies; individual gift aid 
donations; individual non-tax effective donations; individual other donations; unspecified 
individual giving; and grants from other organisations (statutory and private). Commercial 
revenue (is) was derived from the sub-categories of: activities in furtherance of the charity’s 
objects; activities for generating funds; income from trading subsidiaries (gross) and 
associated expenditure; and unspecified sales and fees from operating activities. In this 
analysis we did not use investment income and other income. Although our original panel 
had observations for overall income (i) for each organisation in the population, for many 
organisations Guidestar UK was unable to separate commercial revenue (is) from voluntary 
income (iv). These cases were treated as missing, and so many (predominately smaller) 
charities were excluded from our analysis.  
Some commentators have warned of using English charity accounts to differentiate 
between income streams particularly for smaller charities (Clifford et al. 2010; Morgan 
2010). This is because only those charities with an income of £100,000
iv
 or more are required 
to publish accounts to the standards set out in the Statement of Recommended Practice 
(SORP) produced by the Accounting standards Board (Charity Commission 2005). SORP 
standards provide detailed instructions for classifying different income sources. Therefore for 
those larger charities with an income of £100,000 or more, data pertaining to commercial 
revenue and voluntary income are expected to be relatively robust.  
We considered further restricting our analysis only to charities with an income of 
£100,000 or more in each year of the study. However when we ran our model using only 
these charities we found that results were virtually identical to those obtained using all 
charities. Many smaller charities also prepare accounts to SORP standards, although they are 
not required to do so by law. It may be that the smaller charities in our panel are biased 
towards those that prepare accounts to SORP standards, as Guidestar UK would have found it 
easier to separate commercial revenue from grants and donations for these charities.  
Our econometric analysis was conducted only using those organisations for which we 
have figures for total, commercial and voluntary income. It is important to note the bias in 
our sample towards larger organisations which is to be expected given the reasons pertaining 
to SORP outlined above.  
Figure 2 presents graphically the rise in commercial revenue for the different fields of 
activity for all charities in our panel where we have an observation for is and iv, in both 2003 
and 2007. First we note that reliance on commercial revenue has increased across (almost) all 
fields of activity. 
Figure 2 Here 
Table 2 begins to draw out the longitudinal element to our data. Here we see that the 
proportion of commercial revenue has risen in each year of our study
v
, and that this appears 
to be partly, although not wholly associated with a decline in the proportion of voluntary 
income. This confirms existing findings from NCVO (2010) that charities’ reliance on earned 
income has increased relative to other revenue sources since 2001 in England and Wales. The 
lower means for all income sources in 2006 shown in Table 2 are probably due to us having 
more observations from smaller organisations in this year. 
Table 2 Here 
Table 3 largely confirms findings from the US that larger nonprofits attract a higher 
proportion of income from commercial sources than smaller nonprofits (Fischer et al. 2007; 
Guo 2006). A relatively small number of observations for organisations with an income 
above £100,000,000 means findings for this group (which over-represent medical research 
charities, and organisations not elsewhere classified) should be treated with some caution.  
Table 3 Here 
Econometric Strategy 
In table 4 we show the correlations (all in log scale) between commercial revenue (𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡), total 
income (𝑖𝑖,𝑡 ) and voluntary income (𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 ). As can been seen, the bivariate relationships 
between all the variables are all positive, and are all statistically significant. This largely 
confirms the data presented by NCVO (2010) showing that for the population of charities 
before controlling for time and field effects, commercial revenue is complementary to grants 
and donations.  It is worth noting the high association between commercial revenue in 
consecutive years within organisations, with a 0.86 correlation. This lends support to 
Froelich’s (1999) argument that commercial revenue is relatively stable over time. 
Table 4 Here 
In table 5 we describe how much income varies between organisations, and how much 
income occurs within them over time. The ‘between’ variation shows the variation between 
the average values in each organisation, the ‘within’ variation shows the degree of change for 
individual organisations over time compared to their own mean. For total income, around 77 
per cent of the total variation is between organisations, and 23 per cent within organisations. 
These figures imply that the grouped nature of the organisational data needs to be captured in 
any statistical approach, as the observations are clearly not independent of each other. 
Table 5 Here 
Methodology 
In order to determine whether commercial revenue is a substitute for grants and donations, 
and to estimate the strength of any substitution effect, we developed a multivariate analysis 
which captures the dynamic composition of charities’ income over the period covered by our 
dataset.  
All monetary variables are expressed at 2008 constant prices. We use the following 
specification (1) for charities (i) over time (t).  Variables are expressed in natural logarithms 
and denote: commercial revenue (𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕) and voluntary income (𝒊𝒗𝒊,𝒕). S is a set of sector 
dummy variables to control for possible effects of different areas of activity (ICNPO 
classification), T is a set of time dummies (yearly) to capture both the economic business 
cycle and the commercialisation effect over time. The last two terms are the components of 
the error term (with ui capturing charity-specific so-called ‘fixed effects’). 
 
  
Equation 1. Specification of our model 
ln(𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1ln (𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽
′𝑆 + 𝛾 ′𝑇 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
In this equation i and t label charities and years respectively. We have N charities observed 
over T years. 𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 is the one-period lag of the charity’s (log) commercial revenue. 𝑖𝑣𝑖,1 is 
the charity’s (log) voluntary income (grants and donations) in the current period. Then 𝑆 
represents a set of dummy variables to capture the field of activity specific effect, while 𝑇 is 
set of time dummy variables. With regard to error terms the structure of panel allows us to 
include: 𝑢𝑖  which captures any charity-specific unobservable characteristics, while 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the 
normal error term (allowing for the charity specific term). 
A negative α2, would demonstrate that commercial revenue is a substitute for grants and 
donations, while a positive α2, would demonstrate a crowding in or complementary effect. 
The reasons for including the lagged dependent variable 𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  as an independent 
variable are both econometric and interpretative. From a methodological point of view, the 
persistence of commercial revenue is very high (ρ=0.86) (see Table 4). From an interpretative 
point of view any explanation of present commercial revenue necessarily involves 
considering the role of previous commercial revenue (Tinkelman and Neely 2011).  
There are several econometric issues that need to be considered in the estimation of 
equation (1): 
i. Voluntary income (𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡), is assumed to be endogenous – part of the model rather than 
externally determined. Causality may run in both directions (commercial revenue 
affects grants and donations and vice versa), with the potential for voluntary income 
to be correlated with the error term. 
ii. Time invariant charity characteristics (‘fixed effects’) may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. 
iii. The presence of the lagged dependent variable 𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 gives rise to a problem of 
autocorrelation in standard linear regression and fixed-effects models. 
iv. The panel is unbalanced, with some charities having more observations than others. It 
has also a short time dimension with small T and large N. 
The above dynamic specification cannot be correctly estimated by a standard pooled linear 
regression (pooled OLS). The error term is likely to be correlated over time for a given 
charity and this correlation violates an important assumption that is necessary for the 
consistency of OLS. 
An intuitive way to address the fixed effect is to draw out the error term by entering 
dummy variables for each charity: the Least Squares Dummy Variables approach (LSDV). A 
similar way to address the same problem is dividing the regression in two steps, first applying 
a mean-deviation transformation on each variable, than running an OLS on the transformed 
data. This is the within-group, or just ‘within’ estimator (WG), estimating the same 
coefficients as LSDV but with a slightly better standard error. 
The LSDV and WG estimators are consistent only if there were no lags of the 
dependent variable (commercial revenue). However, in a dynamic model, the WG and LSDV 
estimators are biased (Nickell 1981; Roodman 2006). In order to eliminate such problems we 
use the General Method of Moments (GMM) adopting the approach of Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
vi
  
Two different versions of GMM have been developed to estimate equation (1), based 
on different approaches to instrumental variables. We estimate both GMM-DIF (differenced 
– transforming the data) and GMM-SYS (system – instrumenting differenced values with 
levels). These are intended to deal with the endogeneity of some explanatory variables. We 
use the Sargan test (Sargan 1958) and the Hansen test (Hansen 1982) for over-identification 
of instruments and the first and second order serial correlations to choose our best 
specification of the model and the best set of instruments. The Sargan test (Sargan 1958) and 
Hansen test (Hansen 1982) require the non-rejection of the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid. The first and second order serial correlations test (Arellano and Bond 
1991) require the rejection of the null hypothesis of  first order serial correlation and at the 
same time not rejecting the null hypothesis of second order correlation. We compute a robust 
Windmeijer (finite sample) corrected covariance matrix (see Windmeijer 2005). 
 
Results and Interpretation 
In estimating equation (1) we anticipate a positive α1 capturing the persistence effect of 
previous commercial revenue. A negative α2, would demonstrate that voluntary and 
commercial revenue are substitutes, while a positive α2, would demonstrate that commercial 
and voluntary income are complementary. If α2 were to vary considerably by field of activity 
this would show that any substitution effect between voluntary and commercial revenue 
varies significantly across fields of charitable activity in England and Wales between 2002 
and 2007. 
In table 6 we report the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the whole sample. 
In columns (1) and (2) we report OLS and fixed effects estimators, while in columns (3) and 
(4) the random effects and GMM-SYS are reported. Our most reliable benchmark is the last 
column (4). Since we know that the biases of OLS and fixed effects in estimating the 
coefficient on the lagged term coefficient are in opposite directions (Bond, 2002, pp. 4-5), the 
fact that GMM-SYS estimation of this coefficient lies between the two can be considered as 
confirmation of the adequacy of the chosen estimation methodology (Roodman, 2006). In 
terms of the standard GMM-SYS diagnostic test, the AR(1) and AR(2) tests are both 
reassuring, while the null hypothesis of correct instrumentation (Hansen test) is rejected at the 
1% level. However, we are not overly worried by the failure of the test. Neither the Sargan 
nor Hansen tests should be relied upon too faithfully, as they are prone to weakness 
(Roodman 2006, p. 12). In order to detect possible bias from multicollinearity we have 
calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) which ranged from  1 to 2.27, averaged 1.25, 
and never exceeded the threshold value of  5 (see O’Brien 2007).    
Table 6 shows that there is a lagged effect (α1) on  𝑙𝑛 (𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) of 0.44 in our preferred 
model. Having controlled for the other variables in the model, this implies that 44% of 
commercial revenue is ‘explained’ by commercial revenue in the previous year, a strong but 
not overwhelming level of persistence of commercial revenue in the same organisations over 
time. This would suggest that previous assumptions in the literature that commercial revenue 
is stable over time, and thus marks a rational resource diversification for charities (Froelich, 
1999) should be revisited using up to date models. The sign of the coefficient (α2) 
demonstrates that other things remaining equal a 10% decline in voluntary income is 
associated with a 3.1% increase in commercial revenue. Thus we can say that, at least in a 
small way, commercial revenue is a substitute for grants and donations. 
Table 6 Here 
We repeated the estimation of equation (1) for each of ten broad groupings of ICNPO 
categories. This allowed us to estimate the persistence and substitution effects for the 
different nonprofit fields of activity. In table 7 we report the estimation of equation (1) for the 
five sub-groups, based on ICNPO, where the substitution effect varied significantly from 
general representative charities. We only report the GMM-SYS estimations, our preferred 
approach.  
We found significant differences in the persistence of commercial revenue (α1) across 
all fields of activity. This could be explained by the rapid changes in the policy environment 
effecting charities in some fields more than others. Certainly there would appear to be some 
(negative) connections between persistence effects and the extent of any substitution effect.  
Of particular interest the substitution effect between voluntary and commercial 
revenue (α2) varies significantly from general representative charities in four of the ten fields 
(see Table 7). The fields of social services (-0.70) and law, advocacy and politics (-0.56) 
showed a greater substitution effect than the average for all charities. It may be that these 
fields in particular saw an increase in government funding through contracts to deliver public 
services over the period. Of particular interest is that for charities in the international field, 
commercial revenue is complementary to voluntary income. That is, other things being equal, 
a 10% increase in grants and donations is associated with an 8.6% increase in commercial 
revenue. 
Table 7 Here 
Concluding Remarks 
We set out to explore whether charities in England and Wales were succumbing to market 
forces. Drawing upon a longitudinal dataset constructed from charities’ annual returns 
between 2002 and 2007 we have confirmed existing findings that charities’ reliance on 
earned income has increased relative to other revenue sources in England and Wales. The 
increase in commercial revenue occurred across almost all fields of activity.  
Proving the marketisation thesis requires demonstrating that at the level of the 
individual charity, commercial revenue is a substitute for grants and donations. Using the 
GMM model to control for time and field effects, we have shown that commercial revenue 
was a relatively inelastic substitute for grants and donations over the period. Hence we can 
say with some degree of certainty that charities in England and Wales are increasingly 
dependent on commercial revenue, and that this is an inelastic substitute for grants and 
donations. We believe our study is the first to demonstrate and estimate this substitution 
effect in England and Wales. Moreover our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to 
demonstrate a statistically significant substitution effect using logged variables (and this 
controlling for, to some extent, any bias towards larger organisations.  
However the substitution effect was relatively small and varied considerably by field 
of activity. Indeed in the international field the relationship between grants and donations and 
commercial revenue was complementary. While more work is necessary to begin to unpick 
the relationship between field of activity and revenue mix, we would tentatively speculate 
that the substitution effect has been partly driven by a change in the way government funds 
third sector organisations – from grants to contracts. Future research would ideally compare 
substitution effects across different time periods. Unfortunately there is no English data 
collected before 2002 which would allow this, and Guidestar UK no longer collects the data 
necessary to repeat our analysis in the periods after 2008. Work being undertaken by NCVO 
and the Third Sector Research Centre on a sample of charities will permit more sophisticated 
analysis in the future. However at the time of writing only two years of data have been 
collected. An alternative approach would be to compare England and Wales with countries 
where the move toward contract funding has already occurred (such as the United States). Of 
course this raises concerns about the comparability of data collected for (slightly) different 
purposes. 
Our research has implications beyond providing an underpinning to the theoretical 
literature on marketisation. One part of the existing literature posits that turning to 
commercial revenue is a rational diversification for nonprofits as this revenue source is more 
stable than, and complementary to, grants and donations (Froelich 1999). It would seem that 
this prevailing mode of thought has influenced policy makers in England, at least in terms of 
the coalition government’s Big Society agenda, with a dual emphasis on encouraging the 
commercialisation of third sector organisations while also encouraging philanthropic giving.  
However as this paper has demonstrated, for the “average” third sector organisation 
commercial revenue is a partial substitute for grants and donations and the stability of 
commercial revenue may also be lower than has previously been assumed. Thus while it may 
be possible for governments to both change the ways third sector organisations are funded 
AND to stimulate an increase in aggregate giving, at the organisational level it would appear 
that trade-offs are made between commercial revenue and grants and donations.It is plausible 
that rather than creating a Big Society, the policy mechanisms put in place could actually 
create a split in civil society between organisations funded by commercial revenue to deliver 
goods and services, and more traditional civil society organisations funded through 
philanthropy and voluntary effort. More careful consideration of potential revenue sources 
may therefore be required by charities in different fields. To better enable charities to make 
these choices, foundations, governments and academics across the world should once more 
turn their attention to the interaction between different revenue sources available to 
nonprofits, particularly now that the tools to permit more intricate analyses are available.  
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Figures 
Figure 1. All general charities, commercial and total income since 2000/01 (£ billions) 
(derived from NCVO, 2010) 
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Figure 2. Commercial revenue as percentage of total, by field of activity, in 2003 and 2007 
 
 
 
 
  
Tables 
 
Table 1. Types of commercial revenue 
Type of Commercial Revenue Description 
Fees for service Payments from recipients receiving goods and 
services directly from the organisations. 
Contracts to supply services Payments from government or other third parties for 
goods and services supplied. 
Sales of products not directly 
associated with charitable activity 
Payments for products which are additional to the 
charity’s core mission. For example the sale of 
Christmas cards. 
For-profit subsidiaries Profits derived from the activities of commercial 
organisations owned by the parent charity. 
Fee for endorsing products 
(advertising revenues) 
This relates to a trend in the US for nonprofits to 
develop commercial relationships with for-profit 
companies and receive funds for endorsing products. 
  
 
  
 Table 2. Changes in our variables of interest over time 
Year 
Mean 
Income 
Mean 
Commercial 
revenue 
% 
Commercial 
revenue 
Mean 
Voluntary 
income 
% 
Voluntary 
income N. obs 
2003 £967,272 £493,221 51% £418,247 43% 15,412 
2004 £1,085,852 £560,191 52% £456,768 42% 14,317 
2005 £1,195,861 £640,839 54% £488,959 41% 14,042 
2006 £991,565 £537,991 54% £407,695 41% 18,385 
2007 £1,186,960 £654,693 55% £483,519 41% 15,468 
 
  
 Table 3. Summary of proportion of total income that is commercial revenue in 
2003-2007, derived using aggregate amounts for fields 
 % of overall income that is commercial revenue 
Income Band (£) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
0-9,999 44.9% 54.6% 54.6% 39.0% 44.7% 
10k-99,999 46.9% 46.8% 47.0% 45.8% 49.0% 
100k-999,999 49.8% 46.2% 47.6% 48.9% 50.8% 
1,ML -10 ML 57.4% 53.5% 55.5% 58.1% 58.2% 
10ML-100ML 55.8% 56.5% 55.4% 58.0% 61.5% 
 100 ML- Plus 35.2% 44.4% 52.1% 48.0% 44.0% 
Average 51.0% 51.6% 53.6% 54.3% 55.2% 
N. Charities 15,412 14,317 14042 18385 15468 
 
 
 Table 4. Correlation matrix: income sources 
  𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕 𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 𝒊𝒊,𝒕 𝒊𝒗𝒊,𝒕 
𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕 Commercial 
revenue 
1    
𝒊𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 One period 
lag of 
commercial 
revenue 
0.858 1   
𝒊𝒊,𝒕 Total 
revenue 
0.755 0.723 1  
𝒊𝒗𝒊,𝒕 Grants and 
donations 
0.277 0.299 0.672 1 
      
 
Table 5. Total, between and within variation of incomes in the sample of charities analysed 
 
Standard Deviation 
 Mean Total  
st. dev 
Between Within n. 
charities 
Observations 
ii,t £1,080,025 8,216,884 6,364,110 1,151,771 33,581 77624 
ivi,t £448,651 4,414,996 3,353,913 1,244,772 33,581 77624 
isi,t £575,057 4,679,832 3,419,525 1,384,740 33,581 77624 
 
  
 Table 6. Dynamic panel models of commercial revenue [log(is)] 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Fixed effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
(4) 
GMM-SYS 
ln (𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.84 
[0.002]** 
 0.08 
[0.043]** 
0.70  
[0.002]** 
0.44 
[0.021]** 
ln (𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡) 0.0176 
[0.002]** 
-0.177  
[0.036]** 
-0.010 
[0.024] 
-0.312 
[0.161]* 
Constant 1.75 
[0.285]** 
11.62  
[0.061]** 
3.30  
[0.03]** 
9.34 
[1.748]** 
S Yes No Yes No 
T Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs 77,624 77,624 77,624 77,624 
R-sq 0.73 0.01 0.737  
Within 
between 
 0.02 
0.07 
0.013 
0.737 
 
Hansen    6.22 
p value    0.044 
AR(1)    -19.76 
p value    0.000 
AR(2)    2.03 
p value    0.042 
 
Notes. *significant at 5%;**significant at 1% 
 
 Table 7. Statistically significant variations in substitution effect by field of activity, 
Dependent Variable log(is), different ICNPO classification 
ICNPO Field n 
charities 
Persistence effect Substitution effect 
Culture and arts 3,482 0.43* -0.32 
Social services 7,199 0.39* -0.69* 
Law and legal 
services 
791 0.30* -0.56* 
International 941 0.59* +0.86* 
Overall model 33,581 0.44** -0.31* 
Notes. *significant at 5%;**significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
                                                          
i
 We dropped the year 2008 from the final model as there were changes in the way Guidestar 
UK classified commercial revenue leading to a discontinuity with previous data. 
ii
 Investment income is not explored further in this paper, as it makes up a relatively small 
proportion of charities aggregate income. 
iii
 Which is freely available at http://data.ncvo-vol.org.uk/?p=75 . 
iv
 This has since changed to £250,000  
v
 The decline in mean revenues (across all categories) in 2006 is a consequence of a larger number of 
organisations being included in our sample in this year. While this affects the mean values it has no noticeable 
effect on the trend showing a gradual increase in the proportion of commercial revenue. 
vi
 Data processing was carried out using Stata 11, and GMM estimations were conducted 
using the routine xtabond2; see Roodman (2006) for details. 
